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SURVEY SECTION
Evidence. State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1995). In a sexual-
abuse case, a counselor's testimony that she counseled the com-
plaining witness for sexual-abuse recovery is impermissible
vouching.
In State v. Haslam,1 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island con-
sidered whether in a sexual-abuse case a counselor's testimony
that she counseled the complaining witness for sexual-abuse recov-
ery was impermissible vouching for the victim's credibility.2 The
court ruled that, because the counselor had no firsthand knowledge
of any sexual-abuse, and because any information regarding the
abuse came directly from the complainant, the effect of the coun-
selor's testimony was an opinion that the complaining witness had
been truthful about being sexually abused. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Amy, a fictitious name given to the complaining witness by the
trial court, moved into her step-father's (defendant's) house and re-
mained there for approximately three years.4 She alleged that
during that time the defendant repeatedly sexually molested her.5
The defendant denied the allegations during testimony at trial.6
At trial, the prosecution called a counselor (Swink) that had begun
treating Amy after the alleged abuse occurred. 7 Over defense ob-
jection, Swink was repeatedly permitted to testify that the nature
of the counseling was for sexual-abuse recovery.8
At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of four counts of
first-degree child molestation under section 11-37-8.1 of the Rhode
Island General Laws and two counts of second-degree child moles-
1. 663 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1995).
2. Id. at 902.
3. Id. at 905-06.
4. Id. at 904. Amy and her mother and siblings moved into the defendant's
home shortly before her mother married him. Id. They lived there when Amy was
eight to eleven years old. Id. While Amy was eleven the marriage ended and her
mother moved them from the defendant's home. Id.
5. Id.
6. Haslam, 663 A.2d at 905-06. The defendant claims that Amy's mother is
pressuring Amy to fabricate the allegations against him. Id.
7. Id. Swink testified, over defense objections, that the Department of Chil-




282 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:213
tation under section 11-37-8.3. 9 After the defendant's motion for a
new trial was denied, the defendant appealed the judgment of con-
viction questioning whether Swink's testimony that she counseled
Amy for sexual-abuse was impermissible vouching for Amy's
credibility.10
BACKGROUND
Determining the credibility of a witness is solely within the
purview of the jury.11 Because assessing credibility is a jury func-
tion, a witness invades the province of the jury when he or she
directly or indirectly offers testimony that he or she believes an-
other witness is giving truthful testimony. 12 Even when a witness
does not offer a literal statement of his or her opinion to the credi-
bility of another witness, if the testimony has the same "substan-
tive import" then it is impermissible vouching.13 When this occurs
it is an "improper encroachment into the fact-finding function of
the jury on the issue of credibility of witnesses requir[ing] reversal
of the conviction."14
One way a witness may be asked to vouch for the credibility of
a complainant in a sexual-abuse case is to testify whether he or she
believes the complainant truthfully represented the alleged inci-
dents.15 Except for Hawaii,' 6 courts considering whether this tes-
9. Haslam, 663 A.2d at 904.
10. Id. at 905-06. During the direct examination of Swink the prosecutor con-
tinually, over defense objections, elicited testimony that Swink specialized in sex-
ual-abuse counseling and counseled Amy for sexual-abuse recovery. Id.
11. Id. at 905.
12. Id. at 906.
13. Haslam, 663 A.2d at 905-06. (citing Commonwealth v. Montanino, 567
N.E.2d 1212. (Mass. 1991). In Montanino, an alleged sexual-abuse victim testified
at trial inconsistent with information he had given in a police report. A police
officer then testified that this was similar to what happened with most sex-abuse
victims, that is, they often provide more information as time goes on. The court
held that the officer is saying that this victim is acting in a manner consistent with
truthful sexual-abuse victims and, while this is not a literal endorsement of the
victim's credibility, it has the same substantive import. Montanino, 567 N.E. 2d
1213-14. Montanino is frequently cited for that proposition in Rhode Island. (see
State v. Tavares, 590 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1991)).
14. State v. Desmarais, 479 A.2d 745, 748 (R.I. 1984).
15. David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants
in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological
Evidence, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 41 (1986).
16. Id. at n.216 citing State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982).
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timony is admissible have held that it overreaches into the
province of the jury.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In State v. Haslam, the court held that the impact of Swink's
testimony had the same effect as a statement specifically directed
to bolster Amy's credibility.' 8 The court stated that Swink's only
knowledge of the alleged sexual-abuse came from the counseling. 19
Swink's assertions that she counseled Amy for sexual abuse recov-
ery, while not a direct statement that Amy is credible, had the
"substantive import" of corroborating Amy's previously given testi-
mony.20 The court held that Swink's opinion amounted to nothing
more than Swink's assessment of Amy's credibility and that such
function is solely the jury's.21 The court held that because Amy's
credibility is paramount, Swink's vouching for Amy's credibility
was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. 22
CONCLUSION
In sexual-abuse cases, an expert's opinion of whether the com-
plaining witness was actually molested is based mostly on what
the complainant tells the expert. Any opinion is an opinion of the
complainant's credibility. A jury's function is to use intuition, ex-
perience and common sense to make credibility determinations.
The court recognized that there is a difference to the jury whether
an expert witness is diagnosing that the complainant was sexually-
abused or whether they believe they are being truthful. The latter
is a direct statement of opinion to credibility and is thus outside of
the expert's area of expertise and inside the jury's function.
Kenneth K. McKay, IV
17. McCord, supra note 15, at 42.
18. Haslam, 663 A.2d at 906. The court stated:
Although Swink's testimony that she had been counseling Amy for sexual-
abuse recovery was not a literal statement of her belief in Amy's truthful-
ness, we believe that the testimony had the same substantive import and
would be perceived by the jury as a conclusive opinion that Amy had testi-
fied truthfully.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 905.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 906.
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